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Case Comments
SEC v. Lowe: The Constitutionality of Prohibiting
Publication of Investment Newsletters Under
the Investment Advisers Act
In 1981, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
revoked Christopher Lowe's registration as an investment ad-
viser after his conviction of several theft-related crimes.' Lowe
stopped offering in-person investment advice but continued to
publish his newsletters, the Lowe Investment and Financial
Letter and the Lowe Stock Advisory.2 Consequently, the SEC
sought an order in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York in 1982 to enjoin Lowe from pub-
lishing his newsletters, alleging that he was acting as an invest-
ment adviser without being registered pursuant to section
203(a) of the Investment Advisers Act.3 The district court de-
1. See In re Lowe Management Corp., [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH1) % 82,873, at 84,321 (S.E.C. May 11, 1981). The SEC has authority
to revoke the registration of a person convicted of a securities-related crime.
See Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 203(e)(2)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(e)(2)
(C)(1982). Lowe had been convicted of misappropriating funds, passing bad
checks, and tampering with evidence. See SEC v. Lowe, 556 F. Supp. 1359,
1361 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), revd, 725 F.2d 892 (2d Cir.), cerL granted, 105 S. Ct. 81
(1984); In re Lowe Management Corp., [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. I
REP. (CCH) 82,873, at 84,322-23.
2. See SEC v. Lowe, 725 F.2d 892, 895 (2d Cir.), cert granted, 105 S. Ct. 81
(1984). The Lowe Letter had from 3000 to 19,000 subscribers, with an average
of about 5000. Subscriptions cost $39 for one year or $79 for three years. A
typical Lowe Investment and Financial Letter gave a short-term and a long-
term forecast. It offered advice on the relative desirability of various invest-
ments, including stocks, Treasury bills, and money-market funds, and gener-
ally described the state of the market. It recommended particular stocks for
purchase or sale, discussed precious metals, and announced special reports and
a recorded telephone hotline service. 725 F.2d at 895.
The Lowe Stock Advisory had only a few hundred subscribers and a
number of readers who received complimentary subscriptions. Subscriptions
cost the same as those to the Lowe Investment and Financial Letter. The
Stock Advisory was typically more specific, however, with a brief introductory
examination of general market trends followed by specific purchase, sale, and
hold recommendations, particularly for low-priced stocks. Id.
A third publication, the Lowe Stock Chart Servrice, had solicited subscrip-
tions but was never published. Id.
3. See Investment Advisers Act § 203(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(a)(1982). Ju-
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nied the injunction, concluding that neither the Advisers Act
nor the first amendment authorized such a remedy. 4 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed,
holding that Lowe's newsletters were subject to the registra-
tion requirements of the Act and that revoking Lowe's invest-
ment-adviser registration and barring him from publishing his
newsletters did not violate the first amendment. The appellate
court reasoned that the registration provisions of the Act were
merely a "regulation of commercial activity" permissible under
the first amendment or, alternatively, that Lowe's newsletters
were a form of commercial speech entitled to less constitutional
protection than noncommercial speech. The court rejected the
contention that an injunction would be a prior restraint and
permanently enjoined further publication of Lowe's news-
letters. SEC v. Lowe, 725 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1984).5
The issues presented in Lowe reflect a basic tension be-
risdiction was premised on § 214 of the Investment Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 80b-14 (1982), which provides that "[t]he district courts of the United States
• . . shall have jurisdiction of violations of this subchapter ... ,and, concur-
rently with State and Territorial courts, of all suits in equity to enjoin any vio-
lations of this subchapter." See SEC v. Lowe, 556 F. Supp. 1359, 1360 (E.D.N.Y.
1983), rev'd, 725 F.2d 892 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 81 (1984). The SEC
did not assert that any of the information reported or opinions expressed in
Lowe's publications was fraudulent or misleading.
4. See SEC v. Lowe, 556 F. Supp. 1359, 1369, 1371 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), revd,
725 F.2d 892 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 81 (1984).
5. Lowe appealed to the United States Supreme Court, Lowe v. SEC,
cert granted, 105 S. Ct. 81 (1984), and the Court heard oral argument on Janu-
ary 7, 1985, see 53 U.S.L.W. 3493-95, 3500 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1985)(No. 83-1911).
Following its appellate victory in Lowe, the SEC began proceedings
against several other investment newsletters. In April 1984, the Seventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals affirmed the issuance of a preliminary injunction against
Richard Suter, a registered investment adviser whose National Investment
Publishing Co. had published several newsletters, including the National Port.
folio Reporter and the Profit Reporter, since 1974. See SEC v. Suter, 732 F.2d
1294, 1296 (7th Cir. 1984). A district court had found that Suter's advertise-
ments violated SEC regulations, that many of the representations contained in
those advertisements were blatantly false, and that he had systematically
cheated his subscribers. Id. at 1297. The injunction required Suter to submit
copies of all of his advisory publications to the Commission. Id. at 1298. The
Seventh Circuit reasoned that "[t]he first amendment protects commercial
speech because of society's 'strong interest in the free flow of commercial in-
formation.' . . . However, 'the Amendment does not remove a business en-
gaged in the communication of information from general laws regulating
business practices.'" See id. at 1299 (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 764 (1976); Savage v.
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 548 F.2d 192, 197 (7th Cir. 1977)) (other
citation omitted). In another proceeding pending before the Seventh Circuit
involving the same publisher, the first amendment question is raised in the
[Vol. 69:937
FIRST AMENDMENT
tween the requirements of the Investment Advisers Act and
the first amendment's protections of speech and press. This
tension results, in part, from the Act's unclear definition of a
"bona fide newspaper" and from the absence, at the time the
federal securities laws were enacted, of first amendment pro-
tection for commercial speech. As protection of commercial
speech has expanded, conflicts have arisen between the goals of
economic regulation and the freedom of the press.
The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 is a comprehensive
federal statute regulating "investment advisers."6  An "invest-
context of an administrative revocation of the adviser's registration. See SEC
v. Suter, No. 83-3011 (7th Cir. filed Nov. 16, 1983).
In SEC v. Options Strategy Assocs., Ltd., No. 84 Civ. 4316 (S.D.N.Y. filed
June 20, 1984), the SEC is seeking an injunction against a biweekly options-
advisory newsletter, Successful Options Investing, to force its publisher to reg-
ister as an investment adviser.
The SEC in In re Weinberg, SEC Investment Advisers Act Release No.
918 (July 31, 1984), barred an unregistered investment adviser who published a
monthly newsletter from association with any investment adviser.
The SEC brought suit against the publisher of Stock Market Magazine be-
cause its six contributing editors and its editor-in-chief were paid by public-re-
lations firms for the features they wrote. See SEC v. Wall Street Publishing
Inst., Inc., 591 F. Supp. 1070, 1075-76 (D.D.C.), stay granted, [1984 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 91,635, at 99,219 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 10, 1984).
The monthly magazine had approximately 12,000 subscribers and specialized
in a combination of analyses of companies and stock market tips. See 591 F.
Supp. at 1076-77. On July 12, 1984, the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia issued a permanent injunction forbidding the magazine to
publish until it had complied with SEC registration requirements. See id. at
1090. The magazine appealed, arguing that it maintained independent editorial
control over what went into the publication and that it resembled Forbes, Bar-
ron's, Business Week, and Fortune magazines. See Brief for Appellant at 8-18,
SEC v. Wall Street Publishing Inst., Inc., [1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SE. L.
REP. (CCH) 91,635, at 99,219 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 10, 1984). On August 10, 1984,
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia intervened, reasoning that
the "magnitude of the First Amendment interests" raised by the publisher
"cast sufficient doubt" on the correctness of the lower court's ruling to war-
rant staying the injunction. See Wall Street Publishing [1984 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 91,635, at 99,219-20.
Most recently, in SEC v. Financial News Assocs., No. 84-0878-A (E.D. Va.
filed Aug. 29,1984), the SEC alleged that a newsletter publisher defrauded its
customers and failed to register as an investment adviser. The SEC charged
that the publisher falsely claimed it relied on an advisory panel of former Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency officials and other intelligence professionals for infor-
mation used in its monthly newsletter, Investment Intelligence. That suit is
pending. See 16 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1477 (Sept. 14, 1984).
6. See Investment Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-22 (1982). For
recent general discussions of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, see T.
FRANKEL, THE REGULATION OF MONEY MANAGERS 149-93 (1978); L. Loss, FUN.
DAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 733-48 (1983).
The Act, the result of a 1939 SEC study of problems with investment
1985]
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ment adviser" is defined as
any person who, for compensation, engages in the business of advising
others, either directly or through publications or writings, as to the
value of securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing,
or selling securities, or who, for compensation and as part of a regular
business, issues or promulgates analyses or reports concerning
securities.
7
The Act requires most investment advisers to register with
the SEC,8 a registration which involves disclosure of considera-
ble business information 9 including the adviser's manner of
rendering advice and analyses10 and the business affiliations for
the past ten years of the investment adviser and of persons who
are associated with or who control the adviser.'1 The Act also
prohibits advisers from engaging in fraudulent or misleading
practices.12 Violations of the statute may subject advisers to in-
junctive proceedings13 and to civil and criminal penalties, 14 in-
cluding a limited private right of action by investors.15 The
statute addresses the tension between the first amendment and
trusts and investment companies, was designed to curb abuses in the securities
markets. See SEC, Investment Counsel, Investment Management, Investment
Supervisory and Investment Advisory Services, H.R. Doc. No. 477, 76th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1939)[hereinafter cited as SEC Study]; Investment Trusts and Invest-
ment Companies: Hearings on S. 3580 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940)[hereinafter cited
as Senate Hearings]. For an analysis by the former director of the SEC's Divi-
sion of Trading and Exchanges, see Loomis, The Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 214
(1959).
Other statutes enacted to regulate the securities markets include the Se-
curities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982), the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78-78kk (1982), and the Commodity Futures Trading Com-
mission Act of 1974, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-24 (1982).
7. Investment Advisers Act § 202(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (1982).
8. See Investment Advisers Act § 203, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3 (1982).
9. See Form ADV, 5 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 57,101, at 44,311 (March
9, 1983).
10. See Investment Advisers Act § 203(c)(1)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(c)(1)(C)
(1982).
11. See Investment Advisers Act § 203(c)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(c)(1)(B)
(1982).
12. See Investment Advisers Act § 206, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1982). Invest-
ment advisers are also subject to a separate regulatory system embodied In
state blue-sky laws. See Schoeman, Subscription Advisers, Blue Sky Registra-
tion and the First Amendment, 33 Bus. LAw. 249 (1977).
13. See Investment Advisers Act § 209(e), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9(e)(1982).
14. Section 217 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-17 (1982), provides for a fine of
up to $10,000 or imprisonment of up to five years.
15. In Transamerica Mortgage Advisers, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979),
the Supreme Court held that a private right of action may be implied under
§ 215 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80(b)-15 (1982), "to void an investment advisers
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the SEC's need to regulate securities markets by providing that
"the publisher of any bona fide newspaper, news magazine or
business or financial publication of general and regular circula-
tion" shall not be deemed to be an investment adviser.16
For twenty years after its enactment in 1940, the Invest-
ment Advisers Act was "little more than a continuing census of
the Nation's investment advisers."'17 The SEC had no power to
check on advisers, except in formal investigations charging a vi-
olation of the Act, and no rule-making authority to give content
to the terms "fraudulent" and "deceptive."' 8 The statute was
strengthened by a series of amendments in 1960, 1970, and
1975,19 among the most important of which was the 1960
contract." See id. at 24. The Court went on to declare that "the Act confers no
other private causes of action, legal or equitable." See id. (footnote omitted).
16. See Investment Advisers Act § 202(a)(11)(D), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-
2(a)(11)(D) (1982). The Act does not define either "bona fide newspaper" or
"general and regular circulation."
Several other categories of persons and institutions are not considered to
be investment advisers for purposes of the Act. See Investment Advisers Act
§ 202(a)(11)(A)-(F), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(l1)(A) to (F) (1982). Brokers and
dealers are regulated by a separate statute, the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78-78kk (1982); see also Lovitch, The Investment Advisers
Act of 1940-Who is an "Investment Adviser"?, 24 U. KAN. L. REv. 67 (1975)
(examining the consequences of being subject to the Investment Advisers Act
and attempting to identify to whom the Act applies or may apply); ef. FED-
ERAL SEcuRrEs CODE § 202(78)(B)(iv) (1978) (providing that "a publisher of a
bona fide newspaper or periodical of general and regular circulation, or an
owner or operator of a radio or television station" is not an investment
adviser).
17. L. Loss, supra note 6, at 734.
18. Note, The Regulation of Investment Adviser.% 14 STAN. L. REV. 827,
835 (1962).
19. Act of Sept. 13, 1960, Pub. I. No. 86-750, 74 Stat. 885; Investment Com-
pany Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1413; Securities
Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. I No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97, 164-69 (codified at
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). The 1960 amendments
(1) provide[d] new grounds for disqualification of an applicant for re-
gistration; (2) grant[ed] new power to postpone effectiveness within
certain limits; (3) authoriz[ed] the Commission by rule to require the
keeping of books and records and the filing of reports; (4) permit(ted]
periodic examiniations of a registrant's books and records; (5) em-
power[ed] the Commission by rule to define and prescribe means rea-
sonably designed to prevent fraudulent practices; (6) prohibit[ed]
fraud by those advisers exempt from registration; (7) extend[ed] crim-
inal liability to include a willful violation of a rule or order of the
Commission; and (8) provid[ed] a less restrictive definition of the term
"investment counseL"
S. REP. No. 1760, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1960), reprinted in 1960 US. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 3502, 3503. The 1970 amendments updated and improved
the enforcement and administration of the Act. S. REP. No. 184, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. 2 (1969), reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4897, 4898. The
1985]
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change in section 80b-6 that allowed the SEC to enforce anti-
fraud provisions against both registered and unregistered in-
vestment advisers.20
Courts have interpreted the Investment Advisers Act
broadly in order to fulfill its purpose of protecting investors.
For example, in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.,21
a publisher failed to disclose to his clients that he was profiting
from investments in the securities his newsletter recom-
mended.22 The United States Supreme Court stated the princi-
ple that the statute was "'enacted for the purpose of avoiding
frauds,' not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectu-
ate its remedial purposes. '23 Noting that the Act "reflects a
congressional recognition 'of the delicate fiduciary nature of an
investment advisory relationship,' "24 the Court held that the
statute permitted the SEC to obtain an injunction requiring
disclosure. 25
The Investment Advisers Act was first challenged on first
amendment grounds in SEC v. Wall Street Transcript Corp.,26
1975 amendments made relatively minor changes to the Investment Advisers
Act. H. CONF. REP. No. 229, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 109 (1975), reprinted in 1975
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 321, 340.
20. Prior to the amendment, § 206 provided that "[i]t shall be unlawful
for any investment adviser registered under [section 203] of this title to employ
any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any client or prospective client." Act
of Aug. 22, 1940, ch. 686, tit. II, § 206, 54 Stat. 852 (amended 1960). Section 206
now provides: "It shall be unlawful for any investment adviser ... to employ
any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any client or prospective client
.... " Act of Sept. 13, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-750, § 8, 74 Stat. 885, 887 (codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1982)).
21. 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
22. Id. at 182-83. The practice of purchasing shares of a security for the
investment adviser's own account, recommending that security to clients as a
long-term investment, and then selling the shares at a profit after the increase
in market price following the recommendation is known in the trade as "scalp-
ing." Id. at 181. The defendant in Capital Gains, a registered investment ad-
viser, published a monthly newsletter service, A Capital Gains Report,
containing specific buy-and-sell recommendations. The SEC sought an injunc-
tion prohibiting the defendant from engaging in "scalping" without adequate
disclosure, claiming that such practices constituted fraudulent conduct prohib-
ited by § 206 of the Investment Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(1982). Id. at
182-83.
23. See id. at 195 (quoting 3 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
382 (3d ed. 1943))(other citations omitted).
24. See id. at 191 (quoting 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1412 (2d ed.
1961)).
25. See id. at 201. The Court did not consider the first amendment impli-
cations of licensing and regulating financial newsletters.
26. 294 F. Supp. 298 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd, 422 F.2d 1371 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970), on remand, 454 F. Supp. 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). The
[Vol. 69:937
FIRST AMENDMENT
in which the SEC investigated a corporation that published an
investment newsletter having "all the usual indicia of a news-
paper."27 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals observed that,
in defining a "bona fide newspaper," the key issue is not the
number of "usual indicia of a newspaper" present 28 but rather
whether a publication deviates from "customary newspaper ac-
tivities to such an extent that there is a likelihood that the
wrongdoing which the Act was designed to prevent has oc-
curred."29 The court refused to avoid the "seeds of a constitu-
tional controversy" by enlarging the "bona fide newspaper"
exemption to include all publications that could conceivably be
defined as typical newspapers. 30 On remand, the district court
held that the Transcript fell within the definition of a "bona
Transcript was a weekly tabloid containing verbatim reprints and summaries
of reports issued by brokerage houses concerning specific securities. A typical
issue contained (1) brokerage house reports on past performance and future
prospects for specific corporations and securities; (2) a verbatim report of a
panel discussion among financial analysts moderated by the editor; (3) inter-
views by the editor of a single individual in the business or financial commu-
nity discussing a single corporation or several corporations within an industry;
(4) reprints of verbatim speeches by corporate executives concerning past and
future performance of corporations; and (5) an occasional feature containing
information concerning new issues of securities summarized from public docu-
ments filed by issuers with the SEC. See Wall Street Transcript 454 F. Supp.
at 562-63.
In 1967, the SEC ordered an investigation to determine whether the Tran-
script was operating in violation of the Advisers Act. Wall Street Transcript,
294 F. Supp. at 300. The district court in 1968 held that the Transcript was a
"bona fide newspaper" and thus excluded from the Investment Advisers Act.
See id at 306. On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the
SEC should be allowed to gather evidence and make an initial determination
of "bona fide newspaper" status before the courts reviewed the validity or con-
stitutionality of that decision. See Wall Street Transcript 422 F.2d at 1380.
The court of appeals dismissed the district court's fears that an investigation,
while in progress, would chill the exercise of protected speech by asserting
that the SEC was "fully aware of the importance of First Amendment consid-
erations." See id On remand, the district court found that the Wall Street
Transcript Corp. was "clearly involved in the business of publishing invest-
ment advice [in return for] subscription fees," see Wall Street Transcript, 454
F. Supp. at 565, but nevertheless held that it was a "bona fide newspaper" and
therefore excluded from registration, see id. at 567. The SEC did not appeal.
27. See Wall Street Transcrip4t 294 F. Supp. at 306.
28. See Wall Street Transcript 422 F.2d at 1377.
29. See id (footnote omitted).
30. See id. at 1378-79; see also SEC v. C. R. Richmond & Co., 565 F.2d 1101,
1107 (9th Cir. 1977)(rejecting a registered investment adviser's claim that his
first amendment rights had been violated when the SEC enjoined publication
of a book because the adviser "admitted that [he was] subject to the Invest-
ment Advisers Act by [his] registration thereunder").
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fide newspaper." 31 The district court relied on the facts that
the defendants had never received compensation from any
party for publishing or positioning a report or speech in the
Transcript, had never published any item for the purpose of af-
fecting the value of any security printed therein, had never
traded in any security printed therein, and had exercised in-
dependent judgment as to each item's newsworthiness. 32
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
New York avoided defining "bona fide newspaper" in Person v.
New York Post Corp.33 The Person court held that the New
York Post was not required to register as an investment adviser
because "newspapers of general circulation" were not intended
to be subject to the Investment Advisers Act. 34 Although the
court did not define "newspapers of general circulation," it sug-
gested that the determination "would be a fit subject for judi-
cial notice." 35
The uncertainty about the definition of "bona fide newspa-
per" is heightened by the SEC's failure to adopt a consistent
standard. In 1977, the SEC issued a release stating that it
would apply the "bona fide newspaper" exception "only where,
based on the content, advertising material, readership, and
other relevant factors, a publication is not primarily a vehicle
for distributing investment advice. '36 Thus, registration would
be required for "any author or publisher who writes or pub-
lishes. . . books, pamphlets or magazines which contain formu-
lae which are intended to be used by readers in making
determinations as to which securities to buy or sell, regardless
of whether or not recommendations with respect to specific se-
31. See Wall Street Transcript, 454 F. Supp. at 567.
32. See id
33. 427 F. Supp. 1297 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd merr, 573 F.2d 1294 (2d Cir. 1977).
Person, a private action, was commenced when the New York Post refused to
print plaintiff's "tombstone" ad, which is a brief announcement of a securities
offering, on the ground that it was not suitable for the Post's readers. See 427
F. Supp. at 1301. The plaintiff alleged that the Post "screen[ed] proposed se-
curities offering[s] and . .. publish[ed] only those meeting their standards of
investment suitability." l By screening securities offerings, the plaintiff al-
leged, the Post was acting as an investment adviser. Il at 1303. The plaintiff
contended that the Post had violated the Investment Advisers Act because it
had not registered and had "furnished misleading and deceptive investment
advice to its readers." Id (citations omitted).
34. See id.
35. See id
36. See Applicability of Investment Advisers Act to Certain Publications,
42 Fed. Reg. 2953, 2953 n.1 (1977)(codified at 17 C.F.R. § 276 (1984)).
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curities are made."37 The SEC apparently declined to follow
the Wall Street Transcript court's "bona fide newspaper" test.
In 1978 the SEC informed the publisher of a construction-in-
dustry newsletter that "[ilt is our view that [the 'bona fide
newspaper'] exemption applies to publishers of publications pri-
marily addressed to persons engaged in business and finance
rather than to investors or advisers to investors."I s Three
weeks later, the SEC informed a marketing-research firm that
the firm would be required to register as an investment adviser
even though it sold investment-research reports prepared by
brokerage and investment-banking firms, functions the corpo-
ration in Wall Street Transcript had performed that qualified it
as a publisher of a "bona fide newspaper."3 9
Before Lowe, the Investment Advisers Act had never been
challenged on commercial speech grounds.40 Indeed, when the
statute was originally enacted, no first amendment protection
existed for commercial speech.4 ' In recent years, however, first
amendment protection has been extended to commercially ori-
ented expression4-"speech which does 'no more than propose
37. See id. at n.2.
38. See G. Tsai & Co., [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
1 81,686, at 80,752 (S.E.C. May 16, 1978).
39. See Frost & Sullivan, Inc. (SEC, No action letter July 5, 1978)(avail-
able on LEXIS, Fedsec library, Noact file). In 1984, the SEC apparently re-
verted to its G. Tsai standard when it informed the publisher of a health-
industry newsletter that the "bona fide newspaper" exception "applies only to
a publication that is addressed primarily to persons engaged in business or fi-
nance rather than to investors or advisers to investors." See PM, Inc., (Cur-
rent] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T 77,839, at 79,225 (S.E.C. Oct. 4, 1984). The
SEC did not mention the pendency of Lowe v. SEC.
40. See Boland, The SEC Trims the First Amendmen4 Wall St. J., Dec. 4,
1984, at 28, col. 3 (discussing the SEC's attempt to expand the commercial
speech doctrine in the context of the Investment Advisers Act).
41. As late as 1942, the Supreme Court upheld an ordinance prohibiting
distribution of commercial advertising in the streets in a case in which the re-
spondent had distributed a leaflet urging visitors to attend an exhibition of a
former Navy submarine for a fee. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52
(1942). Justice Douglas, who had joined the unanimous opinion, later admitted
that the ruling in that case had been "casual, almost offhand" and that it had
not "survived reflection." See Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 514
(1959)(Douglas, J., concurring).
42. The United States Supreme Court first recognized a limited constitu-
tional protection for commercial speech in Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809
(1975). In Bigelow, a newspaper editor who printed abortion advertisements
was convicted of violating a Virginia statute that made it a misdemeanor to en-
courage or prompt the procuring of an abortion. See id at 811. The Court
held that the statute, as applied to the appellant, punished speech that was
protected by the first amendment see id. at 825, reasoning that "speech is not
1985]
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a commercial transaction.' -143
stripped of First Amendment protection merely because it appears [in the
form of a paid commercial advertisement]," see id. at 818.
The Court refined the commercial speech doctrine in Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
The Supreme Court considered whether a Virginia statute prohibiting the ad-
vertising of prescription-drug prices violated the first amendment. Holding
the statute unconstitutional, the Court reasoned that the free flow of commer-
cial information is indispensable if private economic decisions in a predomi-
nantly free enterprise economy are to be intelligent and well-informed. See id.
at 765. Consequently, the Court held that "commercial speech" is constitution-
ally protected. See id. at 770. The Court made it clear, however, that commer-
cial speech may be subject to reasonable regulation, such as regulations
prescribing the time, place, or manner of such speech or proscribing false, mis-
leading, or illegal speech. See id. at 770-72.
Substantial disagreement exists over whether first amendment protection
should be accorded to commercial speech. For an annotated bibliography, see
Survey of the Literature: Commercial Speech and Commercial Speakers, 2
CARDozo L. REV. 659 (1981). The focus of this Comment is not on that debate
but rather on determining the scope of protection the Court has accorded com-
mercial speech and investigating whether the commercial speech doctrine may
properly be extended to include investment advice.
43. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 103 S. Ct. 2875, 2880 (1983)(quot-
ing Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on
Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)). Language in Central Hudson Gas
& Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980), defined commercial
speech as "expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker
and its audience," see id. at 561, but that definition was criticized at the time as
being too broad, see id. at 579-80 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment), and
has now apparently been abandoned by the Supreme Court.
The focus of the Supreme Court's commercial speech cases has been on
product or service advertising. See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp.,
103 S. Ct. 2875 (1983)(advertising by manufacturer of contraceptives); In re R.
M. J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982)(advertising by lawyers); Central Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980)(promotion by utility com-
pany of use of electricity); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979)(use of trade
names by optometrists); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447
(1978)(solicitation by lawyers); Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Wil-
lingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977)(sign posting by real-estate agencies); Virginia State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Viriginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748
(1976)(advertising by pharmacists). At least one circuit court of appeals has
expressly stated that the doctrine is limited to product or service advertising.
In Ad World, Inc. v. Township of Doylestown, 672 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir), cert. de-
nied, 456 U.S. 975 (1982), the Third Circuit Court of Appeals was required to
decide whether an ordinance prohibiting unrequested door-to-door distribution
of advertising material violated the first amendment. The court noted that
"[t]he Supreme Court has confined the category of 'commercial speech' to
cases involving 'purely commercial advertising,' "see id. at 1140 (quoting Pitts-
burgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 384
(1976))(other citation omitted), and held that because the community newspa-
per was not purely commercial advertising, it deserved "full first amendment
protection," see id.
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Although commercial speech is entitled to first amendment
protection, it is accorded a lesser degree of constitutional pro-
tection than noncommercial speech. Commercial speech prop-
erly may be restricted when the regulation passes the four-part
test articulated by the Supreme Court in Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission.44  The Court
explained:
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected
by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within [the
first amendment], it at least must concern lawful activity and not be
misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted government interest is
substantial If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must deter-
mine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental in-
terest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary
to serve that interest" 45
Press licensing and prior restraints on publication are almost
always seen as "more extensive than is necessary" to serve the
government's interest, and therefore they usually fail the
fourth prong of the Central Hudson test.46 The Supreme Court
has not approved a blanket prohibition on commercial speech
unless the expression itself was deceptive or related to unlaw-
ful activity.47
Although the Investment Advisers Act has never been sub-
jected to a commercial speech analysis before Lowe, a similar
first amendment challenge was raised against the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission Act (CFTCA).48 In Savage v.
Commodity Futures Trading Commission,49 the plaintiff ar-
gued that a statutory requirement that a license be obtained
44. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
45. Id. at 566.
46. A "prior restraint" is a limit on the right to publish, not a sanction im-
posed after publication. See eg., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539,
556-62 (1976); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714
(1971)(per curiam); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415,
418-19 (1971); Carroll v. President & Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175,
181 (1968); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 149 (1967)(plurality
opinion); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57 (1965); Bantam Books, Inc. v.
Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 714 (1931).
Prepublication restraints have therefore been upheld only in "exceptional"
cases, such as when there is a threat of a "grave and immediate danger to the
security of the United States." United States v. New York Times Co., 444 F.2d
544 (2d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); see also New York
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 725-26 (1971)(Brennan, J., concur-
ring)(contending that the first amendment does not permit prior restraints
predicated on surmise or conjecture that untoward consequences may result).
47. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 n.9.
48. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-24 (1982).
49. 548 F.2d 192 (7th Cir. 1977).
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prior to publication of the Commodity Exchange Bulletin was
an unwarranted impairment of first amendment rights.50 Sav-
age contended that the first amendment protects newsletters
even though they are published in anticipation of economic
gain. Prior restraints, Savage argued, are presumed illegal, es-
pecially where publication is prohibited in the absence of any
evidence of fraud or deception. 51 The Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals rejected Savage's constitutional challenges, catego-
rizing the speech as commercial and observing that the first
amendment does not exempt a business engaged in the commu-
nication of information from general laws regulating business
practices. 52 The court quoted Justice Harlan's plurality opinion
in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts in which he stated: "A busi-
ness is not immune from regulation because it is an agency of
the press .... Federal securities regulation, mail fraud stat-
utes, and common-law actions for deceit and misrepresentation
are only some examples of our understanding that the right to
communicate information of public interest is not uncondi-
tional. '5 3 The court of appeals thus concluded that Savage
could be denied permission to register under the CFTCA as a
commodity-trading adviser r
In Lowe, the Second Circuit relied on two lines of Supreme
Court decisions, one delineating the permissible regulation of
"commercial activity" and the other outlining permissible regu-
lation of "commercial speech." The court first examined the
applicability of the Investment Advisers Act.55 In holding that
50. Id at 196. Since 1971, Savage had been self-employed as a commodity
trader and adviser. His publication gave his views on the commodities mar-
kets. In addition, he advised clients through seminars, lectures, letters, and
personal contacts. Id. at 194.
In 1974, Congress enacted the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Act, Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389 (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-24 (1982)). Pur-
suant to 7 U.S.C. § 6n (1982), Savage was required to register. After a hearing
before an administrative law judge, Savage was found "unfit" to be a commod-
ity-trading adviser. Savage, 548 F.2d at 195.
51. Savage, 548 F.2d at 196.
52. See id. at 197 (citing Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citi-
zens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976))(other citations and footnote
omitted).
53. See id. (quoting Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 150
(1967)(plurality opinion)). Curtis Publishing, however, did not address the
regulation of the content of a newspaper.
54. See id at 198.
55. See Investment Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-22 (1982). The
Second Circuit conceded that SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375
U.S. 180 (1963), was inapplicable because the SEC did not allege that Lowe had
"profited through personal or corporate investments from the investment ad-
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the newspapers were subject to registration, Judge Oakes, writ-
ing for the majority,56 found that Lowe clearly was "engage[d]
in the business of advising others... as to the value of securi-
ties or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or sell-
ing securities."57 Applying the Wall Street Transcript test,5
the court found that Lowe was not engaged primarily in "cus-
tomary newspaper activities" but rather in the activities that
the Investment Advisers Act was intended to regulate.59 The
court thus held that Lowe's newsletters did not fall within the
"bona fide newspaper" exception.6°
The Second Circuit rejected Lowe's contention that Wall
Street Transcript was inapplicable in light of recent commercial
speech cases. The court concluded that Wall Street Transcript
"still states good law"6 ' because the Supreme Court has stated
that government "'does not lose its power to regulate commer-
cial activity deemed harmful to the public whenever speech is
a component of that activity.' "62 The court, finding additional
support in the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Savage, reiterated
that "a business is not immune from regulation merely because
it is an agency of the press."3
Although the Second Circuit preferred to analyze the case
as one involving the permissible regulation of commercial activ-
ity, it found that the SEC's regulation of Lowe's newsletters
withstood commercial speech scrutiny as well.64 The majority
determined that Lowe's newsletters were at best commercial
speech because Lowe sold them and because they were devoted
to discussing the economic interests of the subscribers.s The
court noted that, as commercial speech, the newsletters were
vice rendered." See SEC v. Lowe, 725 F.2d 892, 895 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 105
S. Ct. 81 (1984).
56. The majority opinion was joined by Circuit Judge Van Graafeiland,
who also filed a concurring opinion. District Judge Brieant, sitting by designa-
tion, dissented.
57. See Lowe, 725 F.2d at 898 (quoting Investment Advisers Act
§ 202(a)(31)(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(l1)(1982))(brackets added by Sec-
ond Circuit); see also supra text accompanying note 7.
58. See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
59. See Lowe, 725 F.2d at 898.
60. See id-
61. See id. at 899.
62. Id. (quoting Obralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456
(1978))(emphasis added by the Second Circuit).
63. See id. at 900 (citing Savage v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n,
548 F.2d 192, 197 (7th Cir. 1977)).
64. See id. at 90L
65. See i&l at 900-01.
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entitled to less protection than noncommercial speech and that
"the potential for deception permits government to ban poten-
tially deceptive commercial speech." 66 The court then con-
cluded that a publication ban was appropriate in light of Lowe's
past criminal record and the government's interest in preserv-
ing confidence in the securities markets.67
The Second Circuit rejected Lowe's contention that the ban
on publication was an impermissible prior restraint, concluding
that it was proper to base the revocation of Lowe's investment-
adviser registration on past misconduct. 68 The court noted that
"denial of a professional license for criminal conduct has been a
traditional, and perhaps necessary, aspect of this type of regula-
tion, '6 9 and it stated that the public would not be served by a
decision to "wait until Lowe [has] committed further violations
of the securities laws and then somehow punish him while...
permitting him to continue publishing. ' 70 Formulating a
theory that apparently offers even less protection for speech
than the commercial speech doctrine, the court concluded that
enjoining Lowe raised no more constitutional questions than
would a suspension of a professional license. 71
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Brieant argued that Lowe's
newsletters were not commercial speech because they did not
advertise Lowe's own products. Instead, Judge Brieant main-
tained that the newsletters were analagous to a daily newspa-
per 72 and, as such, were protected from prior restraints. He
concluded that "[i]nvestment opinion . . . is as much speech
protected from prior restraint as is political opinion, philoso-
phy, or gibberish." 73
The Lowe decision reflects an uneasy distinction between
legitimate governmental regulation and impermissible infringe-
66. See id at 901 (citations omitted).
67. See id at 901-02. The court emphasized that although Lowe was pro-
hibited from selling advice concerning the value of specific securities or the ad-
visability of investing therein, he was not prohibited from publishing a
newspaper of general interest or from publishing recommendations in some-
one else's "bona fide newspaper." See id. at 902. The court left open the ques-
tion of "whether a publication dealing only with market indicators generally
or making recommendations only as to groups of securities (e.g., air transport,
beverages-brewers, mobile homes) could be barred on facts such as those of
this case." See id. at 902 n.7.
68. See id. at 901.
69. See id. (citations omitted).
70. See id& at 901-02.
71. See id.
72. See id at 904 (Brieant, J., dissenting).
73. See id at 903 (Brieant, J., dissenting).
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ments on the first amendment's guarantees of freedom of
speech and press. The conflicting definitions of "bona fide
newspaper" established in Wall Street Transcript,74 in Per-
son,75 and in the SEC releases and no-action letters76 have
failed to produce any objective standards. The court in Lowe
chose to read the "bona fide newspaper" exception narrowly. A
narrow interpretation, however, requires judges, at the instance
of the SEC, to decide whether a newspaper is "bona fide,"77
thus leaving a "dangerous editorial evaluation" in the hands of
judges without providing an objective standard.78
Defining a "bona fide newspaper" on an ad hoc basis neces-
sarily entails making arbitrary distinctions. To the Second Cir-
cuit, the Lowe newsletters apparently were different than
Forbes and the Wall Street Journal although, like those publi-
cations, the Lowe newsletters were issued on a regular basis by
mail, were available to any individual who paid the annual sub-
scription fee, and conveyed the same facts and opinions to all
readers.79 Unlike Forbes and the Wall Street Journal, however,
Lowe's newsletters had only a few thousand subscribers.80 The
SEC, seemingly interpreting the Act to require registration
only of small publications, has brought suit against only pub-
lishers of newsletters, like Lowe's, with circulations of less than
31,000.81
Like its holding that Lowe's newsletters are subject to re-
gistration, the Second Circuit's determination that the registra-
tion provisions of the Act are merely a regulation of
commercial speech permissible under the first amendment
rests on faulty reasoning. The court's reliance on SEC v. Wall
74. See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
75. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
76. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
77. Lowe 725 F.2d at 908 (contending that judges, "at the instance of the
SEC, will be called upon to adjudicate the bona fide vel malefide of a newspa-
per") (Brieant, J., dissenting).
78. Id- (Brieant, J., dissenting).
79. See ic. at 903, 908 (Brieant, J., dissenting).
80. See supra note 2.
81. See supra note 5. Stock Market Magazine had 15,000 subscribers. SEC
v. Wall Street Publishing Inst., Inc., 591 F. Supp. 1070, 1077 (D.D.C.), stay
grantd [1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T 91,635, at 99,219
(D.C. Cir: Aug. 10, 1984). Financial News had 31,000 subscribers. See SEC v.
Financial News Assocs., No. 84-0878-A (E.D. Va. filed Aug. 29, 1984); 16 SE..
REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1477, 1478 (Sept 14, 1984). Suter's largest newsletter
had no more than 4,000 subscribers. SEC v. Suter, 732 F.2d 1294, 1297 (7th Cir.
1984).
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Street Transcript Corp.82 for its first amendment analysis was
misplaced. Decided before the modern commercial speech deci-
sions, Wall Street Transcript rested on the assumption that
commercially oriented speech is wholly unprotected by the first
amendment.8 3 Furthermore, Wall Street Transcript did not in-
volve an attempt to ban publication, and the publisher's non-
registration was not directly at issue.84
The Lowe court also apparently misread Savage v. Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission.8 5 In Savage, unlike
Lowe, the publisher traded commodities and rendered personal
advice to clients. 86 The Savage court was also concerned only
with the validity of a Commodity Futures Trading Commission
order refusing the petitioner's registration as a commodity-trad-
ing adviser.8 7 It did not enjoin publication of a newsletter and
thus did not directly address the first amendment issues.88
The Second Circuit in Lowe found that the newsletters
were at best commercial speech and at worst economic activity
fully regulable by the SEC. 9 Lowe's newsletters, however, are
actually more akin to fully protected speech than to commer-
cial speech or economic activity. Because the newsletters con-
tain fact and opinion, not about Lowe's own services or
products, but about services or products sold by others, they
form an important part of the free flow of information. The
public's interest in the free flow of information affecting pri-
vate economic decisions is greater as to economic and invest-
ment analysis than as to commercial advertising. Moreover, the
82. 422 F.2d 1371 (2d Cir. 1970); see supra notes 61-62 and accompanying
text.
83. See id. at 1379 (citing Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942),
overruled, 425 U.S. 748 (1976)).
84. See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
85. 548 F.2d 192 (7th Cir. 1977); see supra note 63 and accompanying text.
86. See Savage, 548 F.2d at 194.
87. See id.
88. In contrast with Lowe, Savage conceded that his commodities newslet-
ter had only the limited protection of commercial speech, and thus the court
did not consider whether Savage was entitled to a higher level of protection.
See id. at 196.
Under the test for the regulation of commercial speech in Central Hudson
Gas, see supra text accompanying note 45, Savage was clearly decided incor-
rectly even assuming that the newsletter was regulable commercial speech.
The Savage court answered the argument that the newsletters were protected
by the first amendment even if they were commercial speech merely by saying
that newsletters were what Congress intended to regulate. See Savage, 548
F.2d at 197. The Seventh Circuit failed to examine the weight of the asserted
government interest or the appropriateness of the regulatory scheme.
89. See Lowe, 725 F.2d at 901; supra notes 64-71 and accompanying text.
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greater degree of opinion involved in newsletters, in contrast to
the objectivity of commercial advertising, suggests a greater
need for tolerance.90 Lowe's newsletters thus should be enti-
tled to full protection of the first amendment.
Lowe represents an unwarranted expansion of the
Supreme Court's commercial speech doctrine. Traditionally,
the Supreme Court has confined the expression entitled to the
more limited protection of commercial speech to "speech which
does no more than propose a commercial transaction'9 and has
focused on product and service advertising.9 2 The Second Cir-
cuit, however, expanded the doctrine to include Lowe's news-
letters, which did not advertise Lowe's own securities but
instead commented only on securities proposed for purchase or
sale by others. Unfortunately, Lowe may become a leading au-
thority for extending the commercial speech rationale beyond
advertising to give other types of expression more limited pro-
tection against prior restraints.9 3
90. In a footnote, the Virginia State Board Court suggested that the truth
of commercial speech may be more easily verifiable by its disseminator than
news reporting or political commentary in that ordinarily the advertiser seeks
to disseminate information about a specific product or service that the adver-
tiser itself provides and presumably knows more about than anyone else. See
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 772 n.24 (1976). The Court reasoned, moreover, that commercial
speech may be more durable than other kinds of speech. "Since advertising is
the sine qua non of commercial profits, there is little likelihood of its being
chilled by proper regulation and forgone entirely." Id. The Court suggested
that "the greater objectivity and hardiness of commercial speech ... may
make it less necessary to tolerate inaccurate statements for fear of silencing
the speaker .... They may also make inapplicable the prohibition against
prior restraints." Id Conversely, it would appear that the greater degree of
opinion involved in advisory-report recommendations indicates a greater need
for tolerance of investment newsletters.
91 Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 103 S. Ct. 2875, 2880 (1983)(quot-
ing Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on
Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)); see supra note 43 and accompany-
ing text.
92. See supra note 43.
93. Lowe's publications were in many ways similar to book reviews, movie
reviews, or consumer analyses. Cf Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United
States, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1949 (1984)(holding that the magazine Consumer Re-
ports did not libel the Bose Corp. by printing an unfavorable review of its
loudspeaker system). Virtually everyone involved in the communications in-
dustry expects a monetary return, either as a method of maintaining the pro-
cess (e.g., televised evangelism) or as the central purpose of the activity (e.g.,
newspapers, publishing companies, professional writers). Adoption of the
SEC's broad definition of commercial speech would encompass anyone who
makes a profit from communication. It was exactly this extension of the coin-
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Even if Lowe's publications are commercial speech, the
court in Lowe failed to follow the four-part analysis set forth
by the Supreme Court in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp.
v. Public Service Commission.94 Although the government
does have an interest in preserving the integrity of the securi-
ties markets and in preventing abuses in the dissemination of
investment advice, Lowe's publications were not misleading 5
Moreover, the injunction against further publication is more
extensive than is necessary to further the government's inter-
est. As the district court noted, "[g]iven the disclosure mecha-
nisms available to the SEC to put subscribers on their guard
against interested investment advice, the censorship that the
SEC would impose on Lowe is more extreme than necessary to
effectuate the congressional goal of a confident and informed
investing public. '96
The Second: Circuit's interpretation of the Investment Ad-
visers Act clearly imposes a prior restraint by enjoining the fu-
ture publication of truthful information and opinion. The court
enjoined Lowe from recommending specific securities while
preserving his right to comment on "any matter of current in-
terest. v9 7 In forcing Lowe to speculate about what precisely the
injunction proscribes, Lowe and other publishers will engage in
self-censorship, a "'particularly subtle and most insidious form
of the malady' of prior restraint."9 8 A prior restraint on Lowe's
mercial speech doctrine that Justice Stevens warned of in his concurring opin-
ion in Central Hudson. See 447 U.S. 557, 579-80 (1980) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
94. 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980); see supra text accompanying notes 44-45.
95. Although the Second Circuit characterized Lowe's newsletters as "po-
tentially deceptive commercial speech," see Lowe, 725 F.2d at 901, even in the
context of commercial speech the mere possibility of abuse is insufficient to
justify suppression, see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-33, at
730 (1978)(prepublication restraints are ordinarily justifiable only where the
unprotected character of the content is ascertainable with "relative certainty"
prior to dissemination).
96. See SEC v. Lowe, 556 F. Supp. 1359, 1366 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), rev'd, 725
F.2d 895 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 81 (1984).
97. See Lowe, 725 F.2d at 901; supra note 67.
98. Id. at 910 (Brieant, J., dissenting)(quoting Universal Amusement Co.
v. Vance, 587 F.2d 159, 168 (5th Cir. 1978), affd, 445 U.S. 308 (1980)). Judge
Brieant criticized the vagueness of the majority's injunction, stating that: "'A
court is required to frame its orders so that those who must obey them will
know what the court intends to forbid.'" See id. at 909 (Brieant, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting Diapulse Corp. of Am. v. Carba, Ltd., 626 F.2d 1108, 1111 (2d Cir.
1980)(Van Graafeiland, J.)). Judge Brieant suggested that Lowe could respond
much as oenologist Walter S. Taylor did when confronted with an overly broad
injunction. Taylor began to refer to himself as "Walter S. Xxxxxx" and de-
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publications causes harm to society by stifling his speech.9
Even if the restraint is ultimately lifted, it will have had a chil-
ling effect on other publications. 0 0
In stating that the publication ban is a legitimate "regula-
tion of a profession,"' 0' the Second Circuit in Lowe extended
the concept of professional licensing to the press. This exten-
sion is unwarranted. Although license requirements have been
upheld for other occupations, 0 2 they have never been extended
to the press. 0 3 Even if the press could be licensed, courts have
uniformly held that past misconduct is not a proper basis for
the denial or revocation of a first amendment license.104
Although a criminal conviction may be reprehensible, it should
not be a legal obstacle to putting out a newspaper.
Judge Brieant advocates a preferable view in his dissent.
He urges that the "bona fide newspaper" exception to the Act
be construed broadly to include all regularly published periodi-
cals. 0 5 Under this construction of the Act, the SEC would not
be able to impose a prior restraint on "bona fide publications"
absent a clear showing of fraud' 0 6 Publishers would also be ex-
empt from burdensome disclosure requirements 0 7
A broad construction of the "bona fide newspaper" excep-
tion is more consistent with the Act's legislative history. The
SEC's 1939 study of problems with investment trusts and in-
picted himself on his wine bottles in a Lone Ranger-type mask. See id. at 910
(Brieant, J., dissenting) (referring to Taylor Wine Co. v. Bully Hill Vineyards,
Inc., 590 F.2d 701, 702-03 (2d Cir. 1978)).
99. See A. BIcmiE, THE MoRALrTY OF CONSENT 61 (1975)(arguing that a
criminal statute punishing expression "chills" speech, whereas prior restraint
"freezes" it, and that injury is inflicted upon our society when we stifle the
immediacy of speech), quoted with approval in Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart,
427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976).
100. For example, a small economic newsletter might refrain from recom-
mending specific investments for fear of being forced to register and comply
with the SEC's disclosure regulations.
101. See Lowe, 725 F.2d at 901; supra text accompanying note 7L
102. See, ag., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 460-62
(1978)(lawyers); Watson v. Maryland, 218 U.S. 173, 177-78 (1910)(doctors); Dent
v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121-23 (1889)(doctors).
103. See L. TRmE, supra note 95, § 12-31, at 724 (discussing the longstand-
ing antagonism to press-licensing systems).
104. See Entertainment Concepts, Inc. v. Maciejewski, 631 F2d 497, 505
(7th Cir. 1980)(theater licensing), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 919, on remand, 514 F.
Supp. 1378 (N.D. Ill. 1981); see also Cornflower Entertainment, Inc. v. Salt
Lake City Corp., 485 F. Supp. 777, 785 (D. Utah 1980)(collecting 23 additional
cases).
105. See Lowe, 725 F.2d at 908 (Brieant, J., dissenting).
106. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
107. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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vestment companies specifically excluded "any person or organ-
ization which was engaged in the business of furnishing
investment analysis, opinion, or advice solely through publica-
tions distributed to a list of subscribers and [which] did not fur-
nish specific advice to any client with respect to securities."'0 8
The Senate hearings on the Act indicate that Congress in-
tended to avoid the first amendment implications of regulating
newsletters. No publishers testified before the Senate Subcom-
mittee on Banking and Currency,10 9 and the SEC's chief coun-
sel submitted a memorandum to the subcommittee addressing
the constitutional issues, concluding:
Such regulation could probably not legally take the form of licensing
publications or prohibiting certain types of publications. Regulation
of the publishing of investment advice in order to conform with con-
stitutional requirements, would probably have to be confined to pun-
ishing, by civil or criminal penalties, those who perpetrate or attempt
to perpetrate frauds or other specific acts declared to be contrary to
law. 110
The memorandum went on to say that "in the case of so-called
investment counselors who function only by means of publica-
tions, a special problem would arise with regard to possible reg-
ulation. It would be necessary to develop a type of regulation
which would not violate accepted principles of freedom of the
press.""'1
A broad construction of the "bona fide newspaper" excep-
tion also avoids first amendment problems. Such a construction
would be preferable to declaring the Act unconstitutional as it
applied to investment-advisory publishers because that result
would seriously impede the regulation of the securities mar-
kets. As the Supreme Court stated: "We turn first to the statu-
tory question since it is a '"cardinal principle that this Court
will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is
fairly possible by which the [constitutional] question may be
avoided." '112
Construing the "bona fide newspaper" exception broadly
nevertheless leaves the SEC with a wide range of remedies
should an abuse occur, including statutory provisions against se-
108. See SEC Study, supra note 6, at 1.
109. See Senate Hearings supra note 6, at iii.
110. Id. at 1009 (quoting Research Department, Illinois Legislative Council,
Statutory Regulation of Investment Counselors).
111. See id at 1015-16.
112. Lorrilard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 577 (1978) (quoting United States v.
Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369 (1971) (plurality opinion); Crowell
v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)) (brackets in Pons).
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curities fraud,-' 3 mail fraud,- 4 and wire fraud-' 5 Most impor-
tantly, the SEC has broad antifraud powers under Rule 10b-5 of
the Securities Exchange Act." 6 The use of 10b-5 against finan-
cial columnists has been approved by the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals. In Zweig v. Hearst Corp.,r 7 the court concluded
that a newspaper columnist had a duty to disclose his intent to
manipulate the market and reap a profit through publication of
his column.18 Rule 10b-5 was broad enough to reach the de-
113. See infra text accompanying notes 116-24.
114. See Mail Fraud Act § 1, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982).
115. See Mail Fraud Act § 3, 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1982). As Judge Brieant ex-
plained 'There exists already more than adequate statutory protection, both
penal and civil, against mail fraud, wire fraud, securities fraud and breach of
fiduciary duty in writing about investments." Lowe, 725 F.2d at 910 (Brieant,
J., dissenting).
116. Section 10(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails,
or of any facility of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security registered on a national securities exchange or any secur-
ity not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contri-
vance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982). Rule 10b-5
provides:
It shall be unlawful- for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
- of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the
mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made,
in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not mis-
leading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which oper-
ates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1984). For a discussion of the elements of a 10b-5 action,
see SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert denied sub
nom. Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969), on remand sub nom. SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), .ffd in part and rev'd in
part, 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 404 U.S. 1005, on remand, 331 F.
Supp. 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). Prosecution under Rule 10b-5 would, of course, ne-
cessitate a change in venue from SEC administrative hearings to a federal dis-
trict court. See 5C A. JACOBS, LITIGATION AND PRAC'rxc UNDER RULE OB-5,
§ 261.01, at 11-264 (2d ed. 1981).
117. 594 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1979).
118. See id. at 1267; see also Comment, A Financial Columnists Liability
Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 10 GOLDEN GATE L. REv. 268 (1980)(discussing Zweig).
Because the Zweig plaintiffs did not argue that the defendant was an "invest-
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fendant because the nondisclosure was "material," 119 and the
columnist was therefore held liable for his failure to disclose.
The SEC could also use section 17(b) of the Securities
Act 120 if a publisher failed to disclose the consideration received
for publishing feature articles analyzing and describing publicly
held companies. In United States v. Amick, 121 the Seventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions of a newsletter
editor for violating section 17(b). 122 The editor of the Indiana
Investor, a weekly investment periodical, failed to disclose pay-
ments received for publication of a favorable article on a corpo-
ration.123 The court affirmed the convictions, stating: "Section
17(b) 'is particularly designed to meet the evils of the "tipster
sheet" as well as articles in newspapers or periodicals that pur-
ment adviser" as defined by the Investment Advisers Act, the court held that
the Act was inapplicable and concluded that the fiduciary duty imposed on in-
vestment advisers did not pertain to the defendant. See Zweig, 594 F.2d at
1267.
119. Zweig, 594 F.2d at 1267. Rule 10b-5 was also used against a financial
publisher in SEC v. Blavin, 557 F. Supp. 1304 (D. Mich. 1983). In Blavin, the
court held that the defendant had violated 10b-5's provisions proscribing "the
use of any scheme to defraud in connection with the purchase or sale of a se-
curity" when he secretly traded in the securities he recommended. See id. at
1310. Blavin's 10b-5 liability was independent from his Investment Advisers
Act liability. See id. at 1315. Blavin's "scalping" activity was not very different
from that of the defendants in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.,
375 U.S. 180 (1963). The Capital Gains Court likely did not use 10b-5 because
it had not yet become a broad SEC enforcement tool. Superintendent of Ins. v.
Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971), was the first case in which the
Supreme Court broadly construed 10b-5's "purchase or sale of a security" re-
quirement to encompass deceptive conduct merely "touching" the purchase or
sale of securities. See id. at 12.
120. Section 17(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of any means or instru-
ments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or
by the use of the mails, to publish, give publicity to or circulate any
notice, circular, advertisement, newspaper, article, letter, investment
service, or communication which, though not purporting to offer a se-
curity for sale, describes such security for a consideration received or
to be received, directly or indirectly, from an issuer, underwriter, or
dealer, without fully disclosing the receipt, whether past or prospec-
tive, of such consideration and the amount thereof.
15 U.S.C. § 77(q)(b) (1982).
121. 439 F.2d 351 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 823 (1971).
122. See 439 F.2d at 365.
123. The Indiana Investor published a report concerning an issuer's corpo-
rate acquisition and investment of over $2 million. The publication did not dis-
close that it received consideration from the issuer in the amount of $2500 for
"subscriptions" to the weekly publication. The appellate court upheld the
finding that the "subscription" fee was actually payment for publication of the
article. See id. at 364.
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port to give unbiased opinion but which opinions are in fact
bought and paid for." 2 4 These SEC regulations and implied
private actions under the securities laws serve to protect the in-
vesting public. Yet because these regulations are based on pun-
ishment after fraudulent conduct and thus are not prior
restraints, they do not compromise first amendment rights.m
The Investment Advisers Act and its interpretation by the
SEC is generating increasing controversy. The dissatisfaction
stems from an unclear definition of "bona fide newspaper" and
from the tension between the commercial speech protection of
the first amendment and permissible economic regulation. The
Second Circuit's first amendment analysis in Lowe overlooked
strong similarities between Lowe's publications and non-
commercial speech. Even under a commercial speech analysis,
however, the injunction imposed is overbroad, tending to chill
protected speech. Moreover, by extending the commercial
speech doctrine beyond advertising, the court invites an exten-
sion of the doctrine to speech that previously received the full
protection of the first amendment. Similarly, by accepting a li-
censing analysis, the court may have opened the door to greater
governmental regulation of the press.
The Lowe court also mistakenly characterized the newslet-
ters as fully regulable investment advisers by adopting an un-
necessarily narrow reading of the "bona fide newspaper"
exception. The court should have concluded that the statutory
language is ambiguous and turned to the legislative history for
guidance. In order to be true to its legislative history, the In-
vestment Advisers Act should be construed with a broad ex-
emption for "bona fide newspaper[s], news magazine[s] or
business or financial publication[s] of general and regular circu-
lation."' 6 Such an interpretation would not threaten investor
protection because of the alternative remedies available to the
124. See id- at 365 (quoting H. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Seas. 24 (1933));
see al7so In re Axe Sec. Corp., [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] FED. SMc I- REP.
(CCH) 77,148 at 82,163 (S.E.C. Oct. 14, 1964) (an investment adviser who pub-
lished an article describing certain mutual-fund companies violated § 17(b) by
failing to disclose that it received consideration from the underwriter of the
companies for publication of the article); In re Willamette Management As-
socs., Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 837 (Jan. 17, 1983)(investment
adviser violated § 17(b) when it published and distributed a corporate profile
about an issuer without disclosing that the issuer paid Willamette $2A00 for
publication of the profile and 2000 reprints).
125. Lowe was not charged with any fraudulent conduct in his publishing
business, and thus these regulations would not apply to him.
126. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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SEC and the investing public. If not constrained, SEC v. Lowe
creates uncertainty for publishers and dangers for their first
amendment protections.
John D. Norquist
